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ABSTRACT 
Drones (also known as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles – UAVs) is a potential source of evidence in a digital 
investigation, partly due to their increasing popularity in our society. However, existing UAV/drone forensics 
generally rely on conventional digital forensic investigation guidelines such as those of ACPO and NIST, 
which may not be entirely fit-for-purpose. In this paper, we identify the challenges associated with 
UAV/drone forensics. We then explore and evaluate existing forensic guidelines, in terms of their 
effectiveness for UAV/drone forensic investigations. Next, we present our set of guidelines for UAV/drone 
investigations. Finally, we demonstrate how the proposed guidelines can be used to guide a drone forensic 
investigation using the DJI Phantom 3 drone as a case study.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Drones, also referred to as Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAVs) in the literature, can be loosely 
defined as an aircraft piloted by remote control or an 
on-board computer. There are a wide range of 
UAVs, in terms of capabilities and prices. Such 
UAVs are also designed for use in different 
environments, such as security, disaster response 
(e.g. rescue missions), mapping and adversarial 
settings (e.g. battlefields). 
UAVs can be considered as part of the broader 
Unmanned Aerial System (UAS), which 
encompasses UAV, Ground Control Station (GCS) 
and Controller. These parts are necessary to 
                                                     
1 Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this paper in order to describe an experimental 
procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply recommendation or endorsement by the 
authors or their institutions, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or equipment are necessarily the best 
available for the purpose. 
successfully, remotely and accurately control a 
UAV. 
In recent years, UAVs have been increasingly 
popular among consumers and the research 
community. For example, the global market revenue 
for drones is expected to surpass $11.2 billion by the 
year 2020, according to a report from Gartner [1]. 
With so many drones purchased for home and 
personal use, the potential for drones to be involved 
in a digital (forensic) investigation will undoubtedly 
increase. For example, it was posited that 
vulnerabilities in driverless vehicles may be 
exploited by criminals, particularly terrorists, to 
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facilitate criminal or terrorist attacks in the physical 
world [2]. The same can be said for drones [7]. 
UAV forensics is relatively less studied, in 
comparison to other popular consumer devices and 
technologies such as mobile devices (e.g. Android, 
iOS, and Windows Phones), cloud computing, edge 
computing and fog computing [25].  
In 2015, Kovar [3] highlighted the essential elements 
akin to UAV forensics, and detailed the process of 
obtaining data from the popular DJI Phantom 2. A 
year later in 2016, Kovar, Dominguez and Murphy 
[4] extended the prior work in [3] to include a 
forensic examination of DJI Phantom 3. Along a 
similar line, Horsman [5] conducted a forensic 
investigation of Parrot Bebop UAV, and Clark et al. 
[8] presented their findings of a Phantom 3 UAV 
forensic examination. 
On the other hand, more than a decade ago in 2007, 
the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
published 'The ACPO principles for obtaining 
digital evidence' [10]. In the same year, the National 
Institute for Science and Technology (NIST) 
published the 'Guidelines on Mobile Device 
Forensics' [11]. Existing UAV forensic approaches 
are generally based on ACPO and NIST guidelines 
(or their variations). This is not surprising as there is 
no published guideline designed for UAV forensics.  
Hence, in this research, we review existing (UAV) 
forensic literature and potential data storage 
locations. In our review, we highlight the limitations 
in existing guidelines, and the need for a guideline 
dedicated to UAV forensics. Thus, we propose in 
this paper a forensic process focused on UAV 
investigations. This process is designed to guide the 
investigation process when examining UAVs.  
We then evaluate the proposed process using a drone 
as a case study, and specifically a DJI Phantom 3 
drone. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In the 
next section, we discuss UAV forensic challenges 
and briefly review existing forensic guidelines in the 
context of UAV forensics. We present our UAV 
forensic process in Section 3, and the case study in 
Section 4. We conclude and discuss future work in 
Section 5. 
2. UAV FORENSIC CHALLENGES 
UAV forensic and security examinations have been 
undertaken by UAV enthusiasts and the fan 
communities. For example, a number of them have 
created their own (often freely available) software, 
which can interpret the data files stored on the 
UAVs. One such example is DatCon, a tool designed 
to interpret .DAT files specifically from DJI UAVs 
[9]. While these tools are a valuable pool of 
knowledge, such tools are unlikely to have been 
validated according to forensic requirements. In 
other words, these tools are unlikely to be 
forensically sound and artefacts obtained from using 
such tools may be inadmissible in a court of law. 
Thus, there is a need for forensic validation work to 
be undertaken by the digital forensic community. 
In addition to the diversity / variation in UAV 
products, it is understandable that the existing 
forensic examination guidelines may not be 
appropriate or sufficient. For instance, the ACPO 
principles for obtaining digital evidence [10] and 
NIST Guidelines for mobile phone forensics [11] 
were both published in 2007, and these guidelines 
may not have kept pace with technological advances.  
In the context of UAVs or UAS, for example, data 
can be stored in several locations, such as the UAV, 
GCS, network routers, and so on. Storage locations 
can also be overt or covert, and one also needs to 
note that in some instances, there are in-built 
persistent storage media such as Micro SD cards 
[12]. There is also the likelihood of the recovery of 
artefacts from flash storage, which typically requires 
some form of direct connection [24]. We would also 
have to take into consideration the likelihood that a 
UAV used in a criminal activity has been modified 
to either hinder forensic investigation or enhance 
certain features such as increased load carrying 
capacity (e.g. in drug smuggling activities across 
borders, or act as an improvised explosive device). 
As previously discussed, there are a number of 
existing digital forensic guidelines. When the ACPO 
principles [10] were created, it was an attempt to 
standardize what was then a relatively new field of 
forensic study. The four ACPO principles were 
generalized so that they are technologically neutral. 
However, it is important to note the key concept 
underpinning these principles is to ensure the 
integrity of the original data. This clearly applies to 
UAV and any forms of digital forensics.  
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There are also similarities between UAV and mobile 
device forensics [26]. For example, similar to a 
mobile device, a modern or advanced GCS is likely 
to have Wi-Fi, Bluetooth or Internet connection. 
Therefore, there is a possibility that the device could 
be remotely wiped or modified. UAV forensics can 
also involve conventional storage media forensics 
[24] (e.g. memory cards are copied) and live 
forensics (e.g. real-time access to a live UAV to 
view data stored on flash memory). Since most 
UAVs do not have a graphical user interface (GUI) 
or inbuilt interface, there is a real-risk that data may 
have been changed without the knowledge of the 
forensic examiner / investigator. Thus, consideration 
must be given at this level of examination, and while 
deciding the order of investigation one needs to 
minimize any potential for data modification. Since 
checking of UAV flash memory requires a live 
interaction, it is unlikely that any two examinations 
will achieve the same result. 
Whilst existing literature is useful to guide a general 
forensic investigation of a UAV, having a UAV 
focused / specific forensic process could be more 
useful to forensic examiners / investigators (e.g. to 
maintain consistency across cases). 
4. PROPOSED UAV FORENSIC 
INVESTIGATION PROCESS 
In this section, we first determine if there are any 
differences between digital storage locations, when 
compared to traditional computer/mobile forensics. 
Next, we propose a new forensic investigation 
process for UAV. 
4.1 UAV data storage location 
In many ways, the storage locations for UAVs share 
similarities with mobile devices. UAV storage 
locations vary, but the medium used to store data is 
primarily either a Micro SD card or flash memory. 
This seems to be an over simplification given the 
constant evolution and advances in related 
technologies. For example, older mobile devices 
relied upon flash storage for operating system (OS) 
storage and Micro SD cards for additional storage. 
Since 2015, most mobile devices use flash storage. 
Given the demand for UAVs to become more 
efficient, it seems likely that they will follow a 
similar technological trend to mobile devices. 
At the time of this research, popular commercial 
UAVs provide OS via flash storage or Micro SD 
card, with a separate Micro SD card for video 
footage. This flexibility allows the base UAV cost to 
remain low, whilst allowing upgrades to storage at 
the owner’s expense. Since there is demand for 
UAVs to remain in flight for longer periods of time, 
and to provide increased 4K support for video 
capture, the likelihood that flash storage will become 
an option (similar to Apples graded internal storage 
pricing) becomes more likely. 
A more significant variance between UAVs and 
mobile devices is the inherent adaptability and 
modular nature of UAVs. UAVs can store data in 
different locations such as the UAV, GCS, and other 
mobile devices used to connect/pilot the UAVs. 
Flight log data is often stored in a single location; 
however, media files are often found in multiple 
locations, usually in different resolutions.  
Investigation on the data obtained from mobile 
devices, laptops and personal computers usually 
incorporate elements of registration information, 
such as email addresses, usernames and payment 
plans.  Since UAVs traditionally do not require 
registration or payment plans [13], this further 
dilutes the association between the device and the 
operator. 
4.2 Proposed process 
Now we describe our UAV forensic investigation 
process step-by-step, using a case study for 
illustration. In our process, there are three main 
stages, namely: preparation, examination and 
analysis/report. The first stage includes Steps 1 to 6. 
Steps 7 to 17 are part of the second stage, and the 
final stage includes Steps 18 to 20.  
Step 1 - Identify and determine the chain of 
command 
Relevant questions to consider are as follows: 
1. How is the exhibit seized? For example, has 
a tamperproof evidential container / bag 
been used, and have photographs been taken 
of the exhibit? 
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2. Has consideration been given to 
electronically isolating the exhibit (e.g. the 
use of Faraday box / cage)? 
3. Does the container state the exhibit 
reference? 
4. Does the container name the seizing officer 
or exhibitor? 
5. Does the container have a unique reference 
number? 
6. Does the container state when and where the 
exhibit was seized? 
7. Does the container have sufficient space to 
sign your name? 
The above questions are not an exhaustive list of 
considerations and should be adapted based on the 
situation, and the guidelines and rules of the 
investigation authority. As with any forensic 
examination, if the credibility of the exhibit cannot 
be maintained, its evidential usefulness will become 
limited. If the exhibit continuity is weak, then it 
creates an element of doubt in the admissibility of 
the evidence and a potential for the defence team to 
discredit part or all of the evidence obtained. 
It is often the case that the UAV will be seized first 
(e.g. due to device failure or pilot error). Should data 
relevant to the case be obtained, there may be a lag 
between when the UAV was seized and when the 
warrant or arrest was executed. Should a GCS be 
found during the search process, it will need to be 
examined to determine if it is linked to the UAV. 
Due to the inherent remote access associated with 
UAVs, consideration must be given to network 
isolation.  It may be safer, cheaper and more 
practical to switch off the UAV at the point of 
seizure. However, since there does not appear to be 
a standard OS across the wide range of UAVs, 
consideration must be given to how data is stored 
and what effect this will have. 
Step 2 - Have conventional forensic practices (e.g. 
DNA, fingerprints, and ballistic) already been 
implemented? 
Digital evidence can also be supported by traditional 
evidence such as witness statements. For example, 
fingerprints and other DNA materials found on a 
UAV can also be used as supporting evidence in the 
investigation.  
Step 3 – Identify the role of the device in conducting 
the offence (Offence analysis) 
This step includes two important tasks, namely: (i) 
Review the case investigation notes to determine 
how and why this device was used during the 
commission of the offence; and (ii) Identify what the 
offence was and how it is alleged that the UAV was 
used.   
In other words, we need to recover artefacts to 
support the elements of proof, and thus focus our 
forensic investigation accordingly. For example, if it 
was alleged that a drone was used during a 
voyeurism offence, then the drone’s video footage, 
etc may be more useful evidence than flight logs. 
Step 4 - Photographs  
During any digital examination, photographs should 
be taken. These photographs may help to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the exhibit was in the 
condition described during the notes. Device images 
should be taken which present the following: 
 Exhibit within the tamperproof container. 
 The tamperproof container, including 
exhibit reference, unique seal number, etc. 
 Exhibit out of the tamperproof container. 
 Exhibit from all possible angles. 
 Any markings or serial numbers. 
 Any obvious modification. 
 Any damage(s). 
 BIOS, if possible (and this can be performed 
later during examination, when data storage 
media has been removed). 
 Load carrying mechanism, if applicable. 
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 Defensive / offensive capability, if 
applicable. 
During the examination, the device BIOS data may 
be obtained. When images are taken, these should 
also contain a digital radio clock with the current 
date and time. Photographs should be taken to 
accurately portray any load carrying mechanism 
(where one can be identified).  Also if defensive or 
offensive capability has been identified, then 
consideration should be given to the safety of the 
examiner and sufficient precautions be made to 
prevent any injury. The list of photographs which 
should be taken is not exhaustive. In principle, 
photographs should be taken of any relevant aspect 
of the exhibit that may prove evidential, either in 
supporting or refuting the supporting evidential 
material or assumptions. 
Step 5 - Identify the make and model 
At this step, identification should be via a visual 
inspection, taking into account markings, designs 
and patterns, and cross referencing. Such 
identification can be facilitated through experience 
and open source researching. Identification can help 
the investigation in a number of different ways. If 
the device has a high value, then consideration 
should be given to whether or not it is a stolen 
device. 
Using local law enforcement resources, it may be 
possible to create a short list of recent thefts and 
burglaries where a UAV was stolen.  Should a 
suspect already have been identified for the theft, 
then this may present investigative avenues to help 
identify the UAV operator. 
Whilst this step is not entirely unique to UAV 
forensics, it is likely to be far more common.  
Computers and mobile devices are usually seized 
from an address or individual, however UAVs are 
more likely to be seized when the operator is not 
nearby or at a crime scene, as such attribution 
becomes more difficult. 
Step 6 - Open source investigation to identify device 
characteristics, potential data storage locations, 
and available forensic / non-forensic tools  
Device characteristics: Identify if a device is 
genuine or a counterfeit by identifying the markings, 
light locations and any other significant feature(s) 
and comparing such information against the 
specifications of the product as listed on the 
manufacture website. 
Potential data storage locations: Whilst some 
memory card locations will be clearly marked and 
easily accessible, some may not. Some devices have 
removable storage, whilst others may have inbuilt 
flash memory. Understanding the potential locations 
for data storage will allow one to plan the forensic 
examination and reduce the possibility of missing 
evidence. 
Available forensic / non-forensic tools: Many of the 
analysis tools which will be used, will likely have 
been created by drone enthusiasts. There are 
currently only a few UAV-specific commercial 
forensic tools available (e.g. Cellebrite and MSAB); 
however, their portfolio of models catered for is 
limited. 
This step is not entirely unique to UAV forensics, 
but given the limited forensic literature available in 
this field, it is a key feature. 
There is no standard location or format for UAV 
flight data, and research is necessary to prevent 
missing evidence or misinterpreting extracted data. 
Step 7 - Identify capabilities (Video/Audio 
recording, carrying capacity and technique) 
The following two steps are arguably the first stages 
which are entirely unique to UAV forensics, when 
compared to other forms of digital forensics.  The 
reason being that, for example, most commercially 
available UAVs are not designed to carry payloads 
and release them.  Commercially sold UAVs are 
‘currently’ not designed to hold a firearm or 
offensive weapon. 
Since UAV investigations will likely be related to a 
criminal offence, it becomes more crucial to 
determine how the UAV was used and what (if 
anything) was adapted to allow the UAV to carry out 
the offence. 
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It is unlikely that one would detail and highlight 
modifications to a desktop computer or a mobile 
device, since neither are historically used beyond 
what they were designed to do. 
In this step, investigators aim to answer the 
following questions:  
 Does the device have a video capture facility 
(see Figure 1a)?  
 Does the device have an audio capture 
facility?  
 Does the device have a load carrying 
capacity (see Figure 1b)?  
 Does the device have an offensive capability 
(see Figure 1c)?  
 Does the device have a defensive capability? 
It is recommended that one conducts a visual 
examination of the device and takes note of each of 
its capabilities, as well as taking photographs where 
appropriate. Where offensive or counter-offensive 
capabilities are noted, consideration must be given 
to minimize health and safety risks to the examiner, 
and appropriate safeguards should be put in place. A 
criminal investigation can change direction, based 
on new information uncovered. 
Step 8 - Identify potential modifications. 
The standard drone specifications (depending on the 
drone) are sufficient for the task they were designed 
to complete. The use of UAVs in the commission of 
some criminal offences may require modifications to 
the UAVs, as previously discussed.  
Thus, identifying such modifications will help 
support an investigation to either confirm or refute 
the alleged use during the offence. An example 
could be the sending of items into a restricted area 
(e.g. prison). Most standard drones do not have a 
load carrying mechanism. Due to flight time 
restrictions, the drone may have a non- standard 
battery (to increase flight time). The drone may also 
have non-standard motors to reduce noise levels. 
 
 
(a) UAV with a camera (HD camera fitted to a DJI Mavic Pro). 
 
(b) UAV load carrying (Image shows a DJI Phantom, where a 
rod of plastic has been taped spanning the legs.  A string can 
be seen hanging down, which would have held the payload). 
 
(c) UAV with an offensive capability (Image shows a custom 
built UAV with a 9mm pistol attached to the frame, which 
was taken from a video showing the pistol firing whilst the 
UAV was airborne). 
Figure 1. Identify capabilities 
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Items of interest include non-standard battery, non-
standard motors, non-standard propellers, non-
standard camera, and load carrying device. 
Identifying the standard characteristics of a UAV 
can prove tricky, since not all manufactures list all 
of the parts present.  Consideration should then be 
given to either contacting the manufacturer directly 
and/or expanding the sources of information to 
include enthusiast forums and similar websites. 
Step 9 - Identify data storage locations. 
Relevant data storage locations in a UAV include 
removable memory card (SD, Micro SD, etc.), fixed 
memory card, flash memory (NAND, NOR, etc.), 
and SIM card. 
Drone data storage locations can vary considerably 
and, in some cases, data can also spread over 
multiple locations. Some drones will capture media 
and store the original version on the drone, whilst 
also streaming a reduced quality version onto a 
storage device (e.g. mobile device or the cloud). 
Some drones will have visible slots, which are 
designed to allow easy access and swapping of 
portable storage devices (memory cards). Often 
these will be the default storage location for media. 
Some drone models will have hidden and potentially 
sealed portable storage devices (memory cards). 
Often these will be the default locations for system 
information and potentially flight logs. 
Below are two drone models with model-specific 
storage capabilities: 
 The DJI Phantom 4 has two removable data 
storage locations on the drone. The first 
contains media data, whilst the second 
contains flight log data (including ancillary 
data such as motor speeds) [14]. 
 The Yuneec Typhon H has one data storage 
location on the drone, which contains media 
data [15]. The flight log data is stored on the 
dedicated GCS [16]. 
Step 10 - Identify ports 
There are a variety of different methods that can be 
utilized to enable interaction with a drone, and 
external ports appear to be the most common method 
used by manufacturers. External ports such as USB 
(2.0/3.0), USB-C, Micro USB and Lighting can 
potentially allow access to a drone’s data storage, 
where storage is considered to be either flash or 
fixed. 
Consideration should be given to conducting this 
type of examination, as it will likely involve 
powering on the exhibit. Any examination of this 
type will require an understanding of the drone 
systems, as data will likely change. 
Should evidence be obtained, the examiner will need 
to be able to explain what data change during the 
examination, and why the evidence obtain during the 
examination can be relied upon. 
Step 11 - Extract removable data storage mediums  
In this step, we recommend the use of non-
destructive methods. Consideration at this stage 
should be to extract only data sources that do not 
require destructive methods (e.g. chip-off). 
Destructive methods should only be considered 
when all other methods fail. As with any forensic 
examination, notes must be made to identify where 
removable storage devices were taken from. These 
storage devices will then need to be sub-exhibited in 
accordance with the naming conventions stated by 
the examiners force. 
Step 12 - Preserve evidence – Clone / forensic copy 
of storage medium 
This is a common practice in many digital forensic 
examinations, as such the process will not be 
explained in this document. It should be noted that 
cloning a removable storage medium may be 
beneficial when attempting to access data which 
may otherwise be unobtainable. 
By way of an example, the DJI Phantom 4 flight logs 
are stored in .DAT files.  These are normally classed 
as ‘Generic data files’, but unlike most file types 
they do not have an associated software to read them.  
When a new flight log is opened, it also has the 
secondary effect of closing the previous .DAT file. 
The last flight log is not viewable until the device is 
turned on. 
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By cloning the removable storage device, the 
examiner is then able to replace the memory card 
with the cloned memory card, power on the device; 
thereby, closing the final .DAT file, and ultimately 
re-examining the memory card which now has the 
last recorded flight data (last recorded prior to 
seizure). Original data has not been changed, but 
new data has now become viewable. 
Step 13 - Traditional interrogation of storage 
medium - use certified forensic tools 
This is a common practice in many digital forensic 
examinations. It should be noted that traditional 
forensic tools may successfully extract media files; 
however, flight logs may show as ‘unreadable’. 
UAV manufacturers may store data in different 
formats, and currently there is no standardization. 
Should any data be identified, consideration must be 
given to checking the data though another tool and 
confirming that it has been interpreted correctly. 
Step 14 - Extended interrogation of storage medium 
This step is somewhat unique to UAV forensics.  
Typical digital forensic analysis is normally 
conducted using  commercial forensic tool, which 
will usually have a proven record for accuracy. Any 
examination using non-validated tools is considered 
a risk. However, until commercial forensic tools for 
all UAVs are available, we may have little choice but 
to rely on open source tools to extract data of 
forensic interest.  
As previously discussed, the capabilities of such 
open source tools can vary significantly. In some 
cases, extracted data can provide significant 
information, whilst others may only provide limited 
data. Examples of such tools include DatCon 
(Primarily DJI) [9], DJIFix (carves images and 
videos through the command line) [17], st2dash 
[18], and DroneLogbook [19]. There are both 
advantages and disadvantages in the use of such 
tools: 
Advantages 
 If the UAV stores data in a format that is 
supported by existing tools, then the open 
source tool can often interpret data that may 
not be understood using existing tools. 
 Tool is also freely available, although one 
should note the software fair usage 
restrictions. 
 Most makes and models are supported (with 
varying success).  
Disadvantages  
 The data obtained is unverified, incomplete 
or corrupted. 
 Tool updates are sporadic or non-existent. 
 Previously available tool may be removed 
without warning. 
 Increased risk of obtaining malware. 
When considering potentially non-validated open 
source tools, validation of results will prove 
necessary [23]. 
Step 15 - Interrogation of the UAV / drone - 
Potentially using a clone of any storage medium 
identified 
In certain circumstances, it may not be possible to 
remove storage devices, such as embedded 
multimedia card (eMMC) storage. Prior to 
conducting destructive examination techniques 
(chip-off, etc.), consideration should be given to 
performing live examination of the device. 
The most common connection is via direct cable and 
this will likely be the case for the immediate future. 
For example, advances in mobile technology and 
digital forensic tools may result in other remote ways 
of obtaining evidence from UAVs. One should be 
open and research for potential connection methods 
appropriate to the UAV in question. 
There may also be product specific software 
available that supports device examination; 
however, consideration should always be given to 
the validity and forensic soundness of the tool. 
Step 16 - Interrogation of peripheral devices: flight 
controller, mobile device, etc. 
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Streaming data techniques and cloud storage mean 
that data may no longer be stored on the physical 
device (beyond system and function files). Thus, 
consideration should also be given to ancillary 
devices that may be used to control the device and/or 
store data. 
Most drones require a GCS in some form, which can 
take the form of a dedicated GCS (handset), mobile 
device (phone, tablet etc.), laptop or potentially a 
computer that could input flight paths without the 
need for later remote access, which could perform 
autonomous flight. 
This step becomes more specific to UAV forensics, 
since it could be considered that UAVs form part of 
the overall exhibit, which is the Unmanned Aerial 
System (UAS).  We do not consider a mobile device 
to have independent components, nor a computer. 
However, the media consistently refer to a UAV (or 
Drone), but never the UAS, as such this stage is 
significant. 
The examination of such devices could be conducted 
using known forensic tools (Cellebrite, MSAB, etc), 
but this process may only be limited to mobile 
phones and tablets which are usually supported.  
Equally computers could be examined using tools 
such as EnCase or X-Ways. 
The larger issue arises if the forensic tool does not 
understand or cannot interpret the file(s) holding the 
required data.  Whilst this guide focuses on UAV 
examination, steps 6, 10, 11, 12 and 14 would also 
support GCS examination. 
When considering GCS in the form of mobile 
phones and tablets, we also have to consider 
applications, since this would be the likely platform 
used to interact with the UAV.  Whilst further work 
around peripheral devices would clearly support and 
enhance this guide, at this stage there are too many 
variables (due to a lack of standardization) to 
include. 
Step 17 - Extract removable data storage mediums 
(Destructive) 
Destructive extraction methods such as chip-off 
should be considered a final resort for obtaining data 
from a digital storage device. Should this extraction 
method fails, the likelihood of obtaining useful 
evidence will be significantly reduced unless another 
method becomes available at a later date. 
From the authors’ experience, it would appear that 
the preferred storage medium for UAVs is a micro 
SD card. However, if the UAV follows the same 
technological curve as mobile phones, this could be 
replaced with an eMMC.  At that time destructive 
methods may become more likely unless the UAV. 
drones being examined are supported by tools 
available at the time of examination. 
Step 18–Initial review of extracted data 
Analysis largely depends on the offence under 
investigation and the elements of proof required. For 
example, image and video metadata may hold file 
creation times and dates, along with GPS data. 
Interestingly, due to the often hidden location of data 
storage locations, suspects may fail to remove 
previous data prior to committing offences. For 
example, our personal experiences have shown that 
often the first images stored on the device are images 
of the suspect playing with the device and learning 
how the recording function works. 
Flight data can also vary dramatically with some 
recording little or no data, whilst others will record 
GPS position (including altitude), individual motor 
speed, pitch and yew and a whole host of details and 
photographs. For example, flight logs generated 
through examinations of DJI UAVs (using the 
DatCon analysis software) showed significant detail, 
including motor speeds and battery usage.  
Conversely, flight logs generated through 
examinations of the DJI GO application on a tablet 
(using Cellebrite software) showed much less data. 
Step 19 – Interpreting and translating of data - Into 
a human readable and evidential format 
Digital examinations can, and often do, produce a 
significant amount of data. There are three main 
aspects to this step, which can be broadly 
categorized as data sifting, data confirmation and 
data translating: 
 Data sifting is the process of reducing the 
data obtained through examination, to only 
case relevant data. 
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 Data confirmation is the process of verifying 
the obtained data and confirming its 
accuracy. 
 Data translation is the process of changing 
often complex data sets into a human 
readable format. 
Step 20 – Report/Statement 
A sound report can have a significant influence on 
the likelihood of a conviction and/or sentencing. 
Specifically, a well-written report should focus on 
the facts of an examination and its conclusion should 
be an impartial assessment of the data obtained 
through an examination. For example, where flight 
log data has been extracted and extrapolated, 
consideration should be given to providing a visual 
representation of the location.  Whilst many options 
are available, often a simple mapping software will 
suffice. Consideration should also be given in 
relation to unnecessary information.  
It should also be noted that while the guidelines flow 
sequentially, each part can, or possibly, should be 
considered as independent, and can be conducted at 
any point in an examination as required. 
5. A CASE STUDY 
In this section, we demonstrate how our forensic 
process presented in Section 4 can be used to guide 
the forensic investigation of a DJI Phantom 3 UAV 
(see Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.DJI Phantom 3 
Since the experiment was designed to evaluate the 
process of obtaining data, rather than analyzing the 
data extracted, the examination notes do not contain 
personal data relating to the UAV (or where data is 
represented, it is edited). No report will be generated 
which contain flight logs. 
As this is a used case exhibit, we will skip the 
requirement for a sealed tamperproof property bag. 
There was also no recorded information regarding 
seizure details or other non-digital forensic 
investigation (e.g. DNA, fingerprints or ballistic). 
Based on our online research, we determined that the 
DJI Phantom series has a removable memory card 
within the camera, and a separate memory card fixed 
to the motherboard. The camera memory card 
usually stores media (images and videos), the 
motherboard memory card usually stores flight logs. 
Our online research also suggested that flight logs 
can be viewed using open source tools such as 
DatCon. 
We were also not concerned with gathering artefacts 
to support the elements of proof in this evaluation; 
hence, the omission of relevant steps. 
This study will use EnCase (Version 7.12.01), which 
has been validated under ISO/IEC 17025. 
As part of our examination, we determined that the 
exhibit has the following characteristics: 
1. Device: 
 Model - W322B (DJI Phantom 3) 
 QR code – P*****1 7*****J  
2. Battery: 
 Model - PH3-4480mAh-15.2V 
3. ID/reference number – 6***********2 
4. Video capture facility - No 
5. Audio capture facility - No 
6. Load carrying capacity – Yes 
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7. Offensive capability - No 
8. Defensive capability - No 
9. Is there visible damage to the device? - Yes, one 
propeller is broken along with minor damage to 
the propeller arm. 
10. Based on the standard fittings (As per the 
manufactures website), does anything appear to 
be missing? - Yes, normally there is a camera 
mounted on the base of the device. However, 
this appears to have been removed.  The 
mounting point and cables remain, indicating 
that it was once attached. 
11. Exhibit measurements: 
 380mm by 380mm 
12. Identified modifications (Where possible, when 
compared with factory default options): 
 Non-standard battery - No (As listed on the 
DJI website) 
 Non-standard motors - No (When visually 
compared on the DJI website) 
 Non-standard propellers - No (When 
visually compared on the DJI website) 
 Non-standard camera - Standard camera 
removed, no camera present. 
 Load carrying device - What appears to be 
fishing wire, tired between the landing 
struts, with a large amount remaining.  The 
remaining amount could be used to carry a 
payload. 
13. Identified digital storage (see Figure 3): 
 External memory card - Not present - 
Normally present but removed with the 
camera. 
 Internal memory card - 4GB SanDisk Micro 
SD card. 
 
Figure 3. UAV’s digital storage 
14. Identified Ports: 
 Micro USB 
15. Peripheral devices: 
 No other devices submitted. 
16. Internal 4GB Micro SD Card removed. 
17. E01 created using EnCase - Complete.  Hashes 
match and this also revealed no bad sectors. 
Carving using EnCase - Complete. EnCase used 
to view data within .DAT files.  Files contain 
dates but no other legible data (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. .DAT files 
18. DatCon 2.4.0 used to interpret flight log data –
Complete (see Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Interpret flight log data 
 
Flight log data obtained, which contained dates, 
GPS locations, etc. 
19. The final .DAT file (FLY104.DAT) contained 
data, but it could not be viewed using DatCon. 
Our online research suggested that the file was 
not closed correctly, and that the DJI Phantom 3 
does not close a .DAT file until it is required to 
open another. 
20. EnCase was then used to clone Micro SD Card, 
and the cloned Micro SD Card was placed in the 
UAV. The UAV was first turned ON, and then 
turned OFF. 
The cloned Micro SD card was viewed using 
EnCase. The final .DAT file was extracted and 
viewed using DatCon successfully. All relevant 
data were extracted. 
Micro SD card was placed back into the case 
exhibit.   
21. After using DatCon, two files were created, 
namely: 
 FLY104.csv contained a spreadsheet 
(Viewable in Excel) listing all the flight 
record data. Notably this spreadsheet 
contained GPS data, battery capacity 
and height. 
 FLY104.kml, when combined with 
Google Earth, plots the route of the 
UAV.  When properly set up, one 
should be presented with an accurate 
flight path. 
22. The summary of data obtained after analysis and 
its relevance to an investigation are as follows. 
The UAV has minor damage, which includes 
damage to one of the four propellers.  This 
would indicate that the device suffered damage 
on impact and would support the assertion that it 
was in flight immediately prior to the crash. 
The device had been modified by the removal of 
the camera and the addition of a load carrying 
mechanism.  The removal of the camera also 
meant that the memory card (located in the 
camera mount), which normally contains media, 
was not present. 
The removal of the camera could also be an 
indication that the user wished to minimize the 
likelihood of attribution, or reduce weight in 
order to allow a larger payload. 
The addition of a load carrying mechanism 
indicates that the device had been adapted 
specifically to carry a payload.  Thus, it would 
support the assertion that the device was being 
used to carry a payload prior to its crash. 
The retrieved flight logs contained the final 
flight, along with previous flight logs.  The 
previous flight logs could contain evidentially 
useful information, which could include the 
home address of the user, along with friends and 
associates.  Previous flight logs could also 
contain historical offences. 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
UAVs will play an increasingly important role in 
future digital (forensic) investigations, as such 
devices become more sophisticated and their usage 
become more common in our society.  
In this paper, we presented a UAV focussed forensic 
investigation process, and used it to guide the 
investigation of the DJI Phantom 3 drone. 
Future research will include extending the work in 
this paper to forensically examine other UAV 
models and makes, and possibly obtain a taxonomy 
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of forensic artefacts that can be recovered from such 
devices (similar to the approach of Afzar et al 
[20][21][22]). We also look at the possibility of 
adapting the proposed process in the vehicle 
forensics [27].  
As previously discussed, one limitation in UAV 
forensics is the lack of validated forensically sound 
tools; hence, this is another potential research 
direction.  For example, the next logical step would 
be to create some form of parsing tool that could 
analyse original data and provide a readable and 
reliable result. Besides, UAV could be integrated 
with radio communication services in the future. 
Hence, forensic acquisition and analysis of artefacts 
from radio-communication services [28] can also be 
explored.  
Finally, anti-UAV forensics is also another potential 
topic of research interest. We need to understand the 
types of activities and their effectiveness that may be 
undertaken by cybercriminals to counter forensic 
investigations. 
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